

JOURNAL OF APPLIED ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy
Hokkaido University

vol.15

February 2024

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy

Editor-in-Chief:

Nobuo Kurata, Hokkaido University, Japan

Editors:

Michael Davis, Illinois Institute of Technology, USA

Tetsuj Iseda, Kyoto University, Japan

Kerrin Artemis Jacobs, Hokkaido University, Japan

Hidekazu Kanemitsu, Hosei University, Japan

Shunzo Majima, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan

Seumas Miller, Charles Sturt University, Australia, and TU Delft, Netherlands

Kengo Miyazono, Hokkaido University, Japan

Taro Okuda, Nanzan University, Japan

Shigeru Taguchi, Hokkaido University, Japan

International Editorial Board:

Ruth Chadwick, University of Manchester, UK; Peter Danielson, University of British Columbia, Canada; Asa Kasher, Tel Aviv University and IDF Military Colleges, Israel; Lee Shui Chuen, National Central University, ROC (Taiwan); Andrew Light, George Mason University, USA; Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Lund University, Sweden; Peter Schaber, University of Zürich, Switzerland; Randall Curren, University of Rochester, USA

© 2024 Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University

Printed in Japan

ISSN 1883 0129 (Print)

ISSN 1884 0590 (Online)

All queries should be directed to:

The Editor-in-Chief, Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy

Faculty of Humanities and Human Sciences

Hokkaido University

N10 W7, Kita-ku, Sapporo 060-0810, Japan

jaep@let.hokudai.ac.jp

CONTENTS

Theory a Body Can Do

Bruises, Becomings, and Affects in Pole Dance ————— 1

Caitlin Coker

A Sense of Relation: Defining ‘Affect’ —————10

James D. Letson

Editorial Note

The *Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy* is an interdisciplinary journal that covers a wide range of areas in applied ethics and philosophy. It is the official journal of the Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy (CAEP) at Hokkaido University. The aim of the *Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy* is to contribute to a better understanding of ethical and philosophical issues by promoting research in various areas of applied ethics and philosophy, and by providing researchers, scholars and students with a forum for dialogue and discussion on ethical and philosophical issues raised in contemporary society. The journal welcomes original and unpublished regular articles and discussion papers on issues in applied ethics and philosophy.

Nobuo Kurata
Editor-in-Chief

Many thanks to *Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy* reviewers

The *Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy* would like to thank the following individuals for generously reviewing manuscripts for us between February 2023 and January 2024. The support and expertise of these professionals promote and maintain the high quality of the journal's content. Thank you very much.

Richard Stone

Shunichi Miyajima

Kengo Miyazono

Theory a Body Can Do

Bruises, Becomings, and Affects in Pole Dance

Caitlin Coker

Associate Professor, Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University

Abstract and Keywords

Since the affective turn in the social sciences, the mind–body dualism which affect theory was designed to overcome lingers in writings about affect and the body. To overcome this dualism, I rely on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s philosophy and map out their becomings in a third region of emerging and circulating affects. At the same time, I criticize Deleuze and Guattari for portraying becoming as intensely physical and yet not considering it through actual physical practice. I argue that dance practice is an experiment in becoming and affect, and I develop a concrete and affective illustration of becoming through empirical research on pole dance practice, especially focusing on the phenomenon of bruising.

Keywords: affect theory, empirical research, anthropology, body, performance

This paper is based on case studies of bruising in pole dance and a theoretical framework of becoming that is employed in the Japanese-language paper “I could die—Feeling Affect in the Becomings of Pole Dance Practice” published in the *Japanese Journal of Cultural Anthropology* (Coker 2022a).

1. Why Dance? Why Affect?

Dancing is addictive. Why? Some people might think it is because it is fun. Perhaps it is fun, but that is not always the case. Sometimes it is hard, and sometimes it is frustrating, because no one can control their body completely, and no one can perform their ideal dance all the time. I venture to say that dance is addictive because it is the body in pure, sheer movement in flux, in which one can feel possibilities and limitations dynamically flow through the body. Dance is a performance that is often watched, perhaps because the viewer can see and even feel this phenomenon from dancing bodies. If I were to hypothesize the attractive quality of dance, it is pure *affect* springing forth from the dancer’s body as its site.

There are many definitions of affect across different disciplines, but I specifically refer to the theory that engendered an affective turn in the social sciences from the 2000s. Brian Massumi’s (1995) essay “The autonomy

of affect” has been pointed to as the catalyst for this turn. According to Massumi, affect is precognitive, pre-personal, pre-discursive, nonconscious intensities that circulate in and among our bodies (Massumi 1995, 2002). Affect differs from emotion in that emotions are intensities that are captured and socio-linguistically situated into a personal narrative that makes sense. Affects often don’t make sense- they include the lived paradoxes, latent possibilities, and linguistically irreducible complexities of when feelings circulate the body. Massumi’s affect begs us to look at that which escapes being neatly organized by symbols or narratives and is seated in the body, especially sensation and movement; however, he clearly states that he does not intend to position affect in the body half of the mind-body dichotomy, and that affect is instead the point from where mind, body, and all of existence emerges. Massumi’s discussion of affect draws from neuroscientific experiments, the idiotic and yet powerful rhetoric of former US president Ronald Reagan, and the actual economic effects of certain mindsets or beliefs; the theorization of affect based on the aforementioned cases is largely based on Baruch Spinoza’s concepts of affect (*affectus* in the original Latin) and affection (*affectio* in the original Latin) (translation from Curley in Spinoza 1985:625, 662). Spinoza defines affect, as so far as it can be known, as increasing or decreasing the body’s “power of acting, *or* force of existing” (Spinoza 1985: 542).

Massumi's conception of Spinoza's affect is as follows: "a body's *capacity* to enter into relations of movement and rest... this capacity he (Spinoza) spoke of as a *power* (or potential) to affect or be affected" (Massumi 2002:15). Massumi, who translated the English version of a *Thousand Plateaus*, also draws on how Spinoza's philosophy is developed in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (hereinafter referred to as D&G).

In this paper, I will clarify and thus develop the idea of affect through an affective and ethnographic approach to pole dance. As an anthropologist, I begin not with a desire to develop a philosophical concept but with a need to understand what is happening in the real physical practice that I find in the field; it is from this need to understand that I employ and develop the philosophical theory of affect. Taking an affective approach to affect means that not only will I discuss affect as an abstract concept, but I will try to make the reader themselves feel the specific and visceral affects that I personally encountered and felt. This is the strength of anthropology, in that it has the power to transmit what happened and what was felt in the field through the experience of the researcher (Navaro-Yashin 2012, Skoggard and Waterston 2015, Stewart 2007). I want the reader to feel the pains and the joys that arise when people pole dance. While thinking, feeling, and maybe even moving together with the reader, I will develop an idea of affect empirically grounded in the practice of pole dance.

2. Affect, Becoming, and Dance

First, I would like to introduce one problem with how Massumi's affect was employed by the social sciences, and how this paper aims to overcome this problem by focusing on D&G's becoming and the emergence of affect in pole dance. Next, I will outline specifically how I interpret and map out D&G's becoming and the emergence of affect within them.

Affect theory in the social sciences has been criticized for upholding the very Cartesian mind-body dualism that it was trying to overcome by reducing the seat of affect to the unconscious body (Cromby & Willis 2016; Leys 2011, 2017; Martin 2013; Mazzarella 2009; Navaro-Yashin 2012; Newell 2018; Smith, Wetherell & Campbell(eds)2018; Wetherell 2012). Recent literature has attempted to complement this approach with the semiotic dimension of affect: to state it very basically, this dimension includes how what is said and what that means for us also influences the way we feel (Wetherell 2012) or how the meanings that material things or environs have for us hold sway on how we feel (Navaro-Yashin 2012; Newell 2018). While this is an important

aspect for affect, it borrows from the so-called mental side of the mind-body dichotomy to compensate for the emphasis on the biological body, and thus I argue that it doesn't provide an ontological framework that overcomes mind-body dualism. This is problematic because mind-body dualism cannot consider the instantaneous arising of affect that envelops our whole being and propels us forward in life. For this reason, I rely on "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible..." the tenth chapter in D&G's *A Thousand Plateaus* (D&G 1987 (1980):232- 309), and in the next section I will outline my reading of D&G's affect that moves past this dualism.

D&G's original term for becoming is the French term "devenir" (D&G 1980: 284), and I understand this becoming as becoming something other than oneself (D&G 1987: 315-6). D&G also draw from Spinoza and state that affects increase or decrease an individual's power to act and thus "affects are becomings" (1987:299). However, affect is not limited to the individual level because "it is the effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel" (1987: 280). As I will explain in detail later, an encounter with a certain "pack," specifically beginning with an outsider that lures one into their group, brings one to experiment with themselves, being affected by that group, perhaps manifesting affects from the group, and their bodies become a base for these affects to circulate. I think that the state of being affected and becoming something different entails living differently, thinking differently, and feeling differently. The unfathomable number of differences that exist in this world are subsumed and made invisible as they are logically categorized into certain forms of representation and knowledge in an array of social institutions. Becomings are experiments to manifest these multitudinous differences as one realizes hereunto unknown affects. Overall, one encounters something different, enters into a state of becoming this something-different, and is affected in different ways; to put this another way, I could also say that one is affected by something- different, enters a state into which they can live/think/feel differently, and pass through a state of becoming something-else. The process of becoming and the circulation of affects are in an intertwined relationship.

In D&G's chapter on becomings, their examples of affect are mostly from music, visual art, literature, and film, and there is a lack of references to dance. I wonder: if the fundamental of affect and becoming is a phenomenologically corporeal, visceral passage from one state to another, then wouldn't dance be the arena for affects? While dance does rely on verbal communication to think about how to make dance, it is unique because it is a nonverbal form of performance. If there is any physical practice that attempts to follow the flow of

affects and tests one's capacity to affect and be affected, dance is it. If there is any physical practice that can go the furthest in asking what a body can do, a guiding question when thinking about affect, it is dance. Dance can teach us more specifically what happens with the body and what processes occur in the circulation of affects.

This paper will not focus on dance works that are presented on stage, but on the practice of dance in the studio. While D&G focused on the finished works of music, literature, and so forth, the practice and creation behind those works can only be known through recollections from its creators or writers as well as through D&G's inference. This paper will not only develop becoming through theory grounded in empirical research, but that research is conducted through the dancing body of the researcher, myself. Through conducting the physical practice of which I write, I have an understanding that courses through my feelings, my muscles, my body. This creates a more specific and concrete exposition of the becomings and affects in pole dance, in such a way that it creates a map not only of individual becomings (as in D&G's examples) but of the path towards and through becomings ad infinitum.

3. Reading D&G'S "Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible"

Whereas Cartesian mind-body dualism separates the life of the body into two opposing quadrants of mind and body, D&G map our existence through two planes of perception. These two planes are irreducible to mind-body dualism and instead are a cartographic approach to a different ontology. I think that we inhabit these two planes simultaneously but also lean towards one or the other depending on the situation and our state. Becoming occurs in a no-man's land that is located between these two planes. Before I discuss becoming, I will explain the two planes below.

The first is a plane of organization, differentiation and development; it is our lives in which we are organized as subjects by different social institutions, like the family and the nation as well as psychology and religion, and the contents of our worlds are differentiated and categorized by their forms and functions. It is on this plane that what we feel is represented and symbolized as emotions and organized into our personal narratives and memories. The world on this plane is perceived through how we are taught to understand our everyday lives, ourselves, and our places in contemporary society.

The second is the plane of immanence, consistency, and composition- a plane that is imperceptible in the first plane. Here, ourselves and the things in our lives

are not perceived by their classification, their function, or their meaning, as in the first plane. D&G write that on this plane "unformed elements and materials dance that are distinguished from another only by their speed and that enter into this or that assemblage depending on their connections, their relations of movement" (1987(1980): 255). In this plane things in themselves are not decided by comparison and classification but exist as sheer dynamic particles and affective intensities. Through becoming, we are moving closer to this second plane.

This brings us to the area of becomings between the two planes. It is here that one can realize latent possibilities through creative experiments within different relations among different actors. These creative experiments begin with an encounter with an outsider and a run-in with a certain deviant group (such as secret societies, a pack of wild animals, or criminal groups) that causes one to try something different and become something other than oneself. Below are two of D&G's examples of becomings that illustrate these encounters and the creative experiments that follow it.

The first example is the becomings that D&G find in Carlos Castaneda's anthropological work *The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge* (Castaneda 1968). In his research about shamanism in Mexico, Castaneda becomes the disciple of the sorcerer Don Juan. In this process, Castaneda smokes peyote and encounters a water bowl and a dog, which is suggested to be Mescalito, the spirit of peyote (Castaneda 1968: 48-9), and what happens afterwards is what D&G call a becoming-dog and a becoming-molecular (D&G 1987(1980): 248-9). After smoking, Castaneda is thirsty and begins drinking from a water bowl that Don Juan placed on the floor. When the dog (Mescalito) also began drinking with him, Castaneda could feel the water emerging from each of his pores as fibers of light, so that he had a mane of light similar to the dog's. Then, Castaneda plays with the dog in a way that they could control each other's movements through their own. In this process, Castaneda completely forgot that he was human (Castaneda 1968: 42-4). This becoming-dog suggests how becoming is not something that one can do alone, but requires an encounter with other entities, like a spirit/dog and water, and also is not some logical, goal-oriented process, but is instead a passage through different states with uncertainty, which is one major characteristic of play (Caillois 1961: 7). It is also play in which one fully commits oneself, to the point of letting go of who they once were.

D&G also raise the example of Hans, a pediatric patient of the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud. D&G explain Hans's feelings not in the psychological language of Freud that portrays that horse as representative of unconscious hang-ups, but as simply being overwhelmed by the affective aspect of the horse he encounters in

the road (D&G 1987(1980): 257-8). Being afraid and yet entranced with the horse at the same time, Hans undergoes a becoming-horse. This process is not difficult, nor abstract; instead it is a specifically physical and creative experiment in movement. For example, whereas the violent horse flings around its large penis, for Hans this affective movement may be to bare his knees. Hans doesn't imitate, nor does he aim to become the horse per-se; rather he is passing through a state of becoming-horse in the present progressive. If we ask what a body is, Hans may never become a horse; but if the question is what a body can do, Hans may feel and exude a similar affective force as the rampaging horse through a becoming-horse. This state is pushing outside of the first plane, it is pulling upon the sheer relations in movement and stillness and the circulation of affects in the second plane, and it is unfolding in between the two planes, before moving onto the next becoming.

4. Becoming-pole-dancer, Becoming-pole

We can see in these examples how becomings emerge and intertwine with affects, and these details are crucial for the design of this research. First, becomings emerge from an encounter with someone/something different than oneself and from outside of one's social milieu. This paper focuses on the pole dance practice of students in a pole dance studio; thus, in their becoming-pole-dancers and becoming-pole, they encounter a veteran pole dancer and the pole dance community from which these becomings emerge. Although this history is not well-documented, from my interviews with pole dancers I found that a large portion of the physical pole-dance moves were created in gentleman's clubs and strip clubs in the U.S. as well as Japan in the 1990s (Coker 2022b). Pole dance began to be learned by mostly women as fitness outside of the club context in the 1990s in the US and the 2000s in Japan, and pole sports has begun to be recognized as a legitimate competitive sport from the 2010s through increased media coverage of pole sports competitions and their champions. Pole dance still carries the deviant image and thus stigma of sex work, and yet it is also being recognized as an acceptable form of fitness, sports, and dance; thus, it occupies an ambiguous position in society. This social positioning of pole dancers as so-called outsiders, in a sense, is conducive to the process of becoming.

Second, D&G expressly state: "Affects are becomings" (D&G 1987(1980): 256). It is certainly affects that drive these encounters and the passage through different becomings, and it is also encounters and the emerging of different relations that allow affect to spread among bodies and subsequently augment or diminish their power of activity. Dance practice

is an experimentation in affect that creatively probes what a body can do. With pole dance, not only is it a nonverbal form of performance but also it demonstrates a relationship with the stainless-steel pole in mid-air that makes it different from ordinary ways of moving on the ground and with gravity. These specific characteristics allow for the affects and becomings in pole dance to be quite pronounced and exaggerated, as I will portray in the next section through my fieldwork.

Next, I will introduce and discuss case studies from my fieldwork on pole dance to develop the ideas of becomings=affects. I began fieldwork on pole dance in 2015 when I started working at a small show pub called "Café Panic Rabbit 84" in southern Osaka (see Coker 2022b) and attending lessons in Kyoto. This fieldwork method is called participant-observation, but this research is heavily based on participation; I couldn't write fieldnotes when I was working and dancing, so I wrote them directly afterwards or the next morning. From 2018, I expanded my research to include pole sports and pole dance competitions, attending two larger studios in Osaka and Kyoto. I kept fieldnotes about my experience in the studio and at competitions, and I conducted semi-structured and unstructured interviews with pole dancers in-person as well as structured interviews online.

As I trained and performed pole dance, I interacted with a large number of pole dance practitioners; this paper especially draws on interactions with 32 people who trained together with me on a regular basis of about five days a week, responded to structured interviews, and provided me with photographs. Their ages ranged from their 20s to their 50s, with women in their 30s being the most prevalent. Although they are not featured in this paper, there are also women in their 60s who participate in this research and practice pole dance vigorously. While women are more common, there were ten men who participated in this research and provided photographs. While I am applying this male/female dichotomy for the convenience of describing the participants in this research, I will point out that there were participants who seemed to blur the binary of male/female, but they are not featured in this paper.

5. Moving towards the Second Plane in Pole Dance Becomings

Specifically, I will discuss becomings=affects by introducing a phenomenon that all practitioners seemed to share: bruising from friction between or collision of the body and pole (see figure 1 and figure 2). This bruising will have different forms and meanings and yet point towards similar becomings and affects. The body stays on the pole and above ground by pressing

and squeezing bare skin against the pole. Let me use the metaphor of walking: when we walk on the ground, our feet press into the floor, and with each step we fall once and catch ourselves with the other foot. Moving up on the pole is similar, in that the practitioner maintains contact with one part of the body to free up another, which then latches onto the pole by pulling away from it or pushing against it. To stay up on the pole, they squeeze and then push or pull the pole not only with their hands, but with many different body parts, including but not limited to the back of their knees, the front of their knees, their shins, the tops of their feet, their shoulders, the inside of their elbows, the inside of their thighs, and their armpits. When this body part is not accustomed to being pressed against the pole in this manner, it often bruises. They are resisting the pull of gravity, and that causes friction between the skin and the pole. In addition to this challenge, new pole moves often feel strange and uncomfortable, and they may have trouble coordinating the body to achieve stability on the pole. Often, after they become accustomed to a certain movement and practice it regularly, bruising will no longer occur in that particular location.



Figure 1



Figure 2

Collages made from photographs of bruises provided by research collaborators

This bruising is a physical manifestation of the becomings through which the pole dancer passes. First, it demonstrates the uncertainty of this transformation, since we can assume that most do not try to bruise themselves on purpose. For example, a young woman in her 20s who enjoys golfing and puppies, told me that “when I had first started pole dance I had bruises all over my legs all the time;” I was there for this informant’s first lesson, when she and a friend giddily tried a beginner’s pole dance lesson. I watched as her friend stopped attending lessons, but this woman gradually attended more frequently- from once a week to three or four times a week- by herself, subsequently rising into the more advanced lessons and installing a pole in her home. I noticed that as she made advancements in her skill level, she seldom had bruises on her legs. These bruises, as well as the fading of the bruises, are physical outcomes of changes in the relations in movement on the second plane of immanence.

Figures 1 and 2 were composed not merely to portray the bruises in pole dance, but to transmit that affect to the reader. I hope that the reader can imagine how different body parts collide with or squeeze into the pole and how that may hurt. I also want the reader to imagine and feel the rush of energy, in other words the sheer affects, that would be required for the practitioner to

not notice, or to only minimally feel these bruises. One informant in her 20s, who competes at the international level and specializes in tricks that require a high level of flexibility, told me that “it is pain that only lasts for a second, so I don’t really mind it much.” Pain becomes a regular part of pole dance, and I could often hear cries of pain accompanied by laughter in the attempts at new tricks. I argue that this is the sign of them being pulled towards the second plane of pure affects and the capacity to feel these affects in new relations. As their energy for this practice is augmented by the affects realized through pole dance, pain becomes drowned out by the magnitude of other positive affects.

Affects, by definition, cannot be verbalized, but these participants were able to vaguely describe the nature of the positive affects in pole dance. Some told me that pole dance was “fun (*tanoshii*);” when I asked what was fun about it, I was often told that being able to do something new, that “sense of achievement (*tasseikan*)” was fun. This is quite in line with the idea of becoming, because through creative experimentation one can enter new relations and be able to do something different, thus augmenting or diminishing their energy. When pole practitioners can enter a new relationship with the pole, it leads to physical discomfort, bruising, and oftentimes pain, but being able to do something new augments their energy, which is their experience of “fun.”

Being able to do something new can be called becoming-pole-dancer, since it is from the encounter with the somewhat-deviant group of pole dancers in which the practitioner becomes able to generate affects similar to those moving through pole dancers. This could be moving around or up the pole fluidly, stopping in an impressive pose, or displaying their bodies in a sensual way, in general. However, I think there is a point where practitioners go beyond trying to become-pole-dancer and towards becoming-pole; This is where they create their own moves and styles based on their relationship with the pole becoming stable in the air like the pole does. Perhaps this is because becomings do not occur through imitation, and each practitioner finds their own way to encounter pole-dancer-ness and thus pole-ness. This way of encountering can never be settled and never lead to a complete achievement of pole-dancer-hood or pole-hood, leading practitioners to repeat incomplete experiments when they train. This suggests why they continue pole dance even though they receive bruises and pain, something that they were not hoping for in the first place.

I noticed one practitioner who attended five or six times a week, as I did, and even if she had business trips, she would often visit local pole dance studios on those trips. Pole dance classes are often held at night after the participants finish work, ranging anywhere from 6:30 to 10:00 pm, and she visited these lessons as well. I asked

her why she attended so much despite of her busy work, and she nonchalantly replied, “to release stress (*stress hassan*).” She is a salaried worker at a major company, and yet she doesn’t want to go home and relax after a hard day at work and instead wants to go to a pole dance studio where the instructors will make her work physically, doing backbends, spinning around the pole upside down, and performing tricks that require strength and flexibility. Rather, doing these things seems to give her energy; even when I met her coincidentally at the grocery store after a lesson at around 9pm she smiled and laughed at the chance encounter. In the end, we took a picture in the prepared foods section, while both of us were undoubtedly hungry as we hadn’t had dinner yet.

Although pole dance is strenuous, the practice’s affects augment our capacity for activity. It is paradoxical- the more energy one exerts, the more energy one gets. In the process, not only the pain but also any other negative affects- feelings of irritation or stress, even hunger or sleepiness- often are wiped away and the body is replenished with positive affects from pole dance. This is a prime example of the nonconscious passage from one state to another that is a becoming while it is affect in itself.

While bruising is an effect of the preliminary becomings in pole dance, an absence of bruising is the outcome of the repetition and continuation of this becoming. For becomings aren’t a static state but a passage from one state to the next. The practitioner cannot stay in the same state but must always be moving, training, and then attempting a new move, a new trick, a new performance. If they try to do nothing and stay in the same place, their becomings and affects will fade, just as their bruising fades. There was one practitioner, a woman in her 30s who worked as a part-time model, and she also practiced about five or six times a week. However, she didn’t participate in competitions, only performing in recitals held at the studio. I asked why she practiced so frequently, and she said that she was afraid of losing the abilities that she had gained. I could understand- she was quite skilled, but it was not the case that she was flexible or strong from the beginning. These were all pathways in her body that she opened from her experiments in pole dance, and she was aware that they were pathways that would close to her if she did not continue moving on the pole. If we ask what this suggests for becomings, we can consider how once affects emerge, that doesn’t mean that they sediment in a static way; they may move away from the practitioner and fade with time, like the bruises themselves. Becomings come from an encounter, and one becoming leads to the next. The physical practices and thus bodies continually change each day. Perhaps dancing is addictive because it is sometimes nearing completion, sometimes getting farther away from completion, and always never complete. This

uncertainty generates a fluctuation of affects that lift one up before letting one down and then lifting one up again. The dancer cannot control it, and the only thing they can control is the choice to stop or to keep going. If they stop, those becomings and those affects will fade, but if they continue, their body will be hurled further through unpredictable becomings and unknown yet latent affects.

Another possibility is that the practitioner may go completely to the second plane and self-destruct. Deleuze and Guattari state that it is important for someone to stay in between planes one and two, and if they were to completely go to the second plane, they would be destroyed. One example they give of this kind of destruction are drug addicts; perhaps they can experience the second plane, maybe even create great art from that experience, but going too far will lead to their destruction. In the case of pole dance, it can lead to heavy and even fatal injuries, either destroying the body by pushing it too far or falling from the three or four-meter heights of the pole. Pole dance demonstrates the importance of being moderate in a becoming and not completely going to the second plane of immanence. It is in the in-between zone of the becomings that the practitioner can experiment and move through different affective states.

6. Moving Away from the First Plane in Pole Dance Becomings

The previous section focused on becomings as a passage towards the second plane without completely arriving there. In the next section, I will discuss how becomings are a passage that is moving away from existence on the first plane.

These bruises also become a physical symbol of their pulling away from the first plane of organization, in which they are an office worker or a housewife, and towards a certain outsider in society, that of the pole dancer. It all begins with the encounter with the pole dancer and of course the encounter with the pole. While talking about bruising to an instructor, I was informed that some students quit pole dance once they learn about the bruising that will occur; for example, women who model professionally will have difficulty working if they are covered in unsightly bruises. Having strange bruises all over one's body won't make it easy for anyone to lead a so-called normal life in Japanese society, especially not women.

In contrast, the participants who provided me with pictures of their bruises instead found a positive meaning in them: bruises were often called a "badge of honor" by instructors as well as the practitioners in that they are a symbol for their hard work at pole dance. These same practitioners undoubtedly know that bruises are

recognized as something else in general society; for example, the women would often jokingly say that they hope others don't think that they are victims of domestic violence if their bruises are spotted at work. This suggests an interaction between the becomings and the first plane of organization- by reclaiming the meaning of their bruises, practitioners first deterritorialize the meaning of bruises from general society and reterritorialize that meaning within the context of the pole dance studio.

The pole dance studio is a somewhat deviant group in that it exists outside of the productive working society and carries with it a certain degree of social stigma, at the same time that it is ambiguous because of its partial acceptance as a competitive sport, as evidenced in media coverage of Japanese pole dancers who win international pole dance competitions. While D&G's examples of outsider groups are extreme- like vampires, packs of mice, secret societies, and so forth- this example of the pole dance studio community as an outsider group exhibits the complexities and ambiguities that come with real life practices of becomings.

Aside from the bruises, there were other physical characteristics that made participants feel their disconnection from their social selves in the first plane. One of this research's participants, a woman in her 30s, works as a pharmacist and often shared how pole dancing affected her work life. As her shoulders grew in width from the muscle required for pole dance, people around her would often exclaim "your shoulders!" or clerks at clothing shops would suggest sizes for tops that were too small for her, unaware of how wide her shoulders were in proportion to the rest of her body. Another woman in her 40s who always had immaculately curled hair and well-applied makeup, looking like a proper kind of woman in Osaka society, said that when she felt muscle soreness from pole the next day at work, she was happy and felt like it was her secret. On several occasions, I also have been told something about my appearance or my muscles- often people make comments about my back muscles or my biceps when I show them my pole dance, before even commenting on the dance itself. In Japanese society, especially, the ideal for women seems for them to be round, with soft body lines, and this practice of pole dance pushes its female practitioners outside of this ideal. The more one practices pole dance, the more pronounced their muscular structures will become, taking them further away from the gender norms for women in Japanese society. The aforementioned pharmacist chooses her clothing in order to camouflage the size of her shoulders, and thus women who work daytime jobs can also find ways to blend their muscular pole bodies back into the image of a typical woman in Japan. Also, women who work as pole dancers in clubs or bars often try to approximate themselves again with gender norms

in the first plane, of getting their bodies ready for the heterosexual male gaze, by putting in several pads or bras underneath their costumes. The more pole dancers approach the second plane of immanence, of diving into the pure affects of pole dance in trying to become stable in the air like the pole, in other words a becoming-pole, the more they are pulled away from the gender norms in the first plane.

The deviation from gender stereotypes regarding physical appearance in the first plane were the most marked for women, but men in this study also discovered adversity in general society regarding their pole dance practice. For example, one heterosexual man in his 20s who participated in this study stated that he was chided as being homosexual when he quite his day job and began seriously training in pole dance. Another recalled that he was told by others that men pole dancing were *kimoi*, meaning gross. Both men who told me this have won national and international competitions, and we can think that they include these stories of simplified derisions in the process of organizing their narrative as one of overcoming adversity.

Another male participant in his 30s demonstrates more accurately the ambiguous nature of how his pole dance training, or rather pole dance becomings, affected his category as an adult male in the first plane. When he first competed in Japan's national pole dance competition in Osaka, his mother came to watch as a sign of support. Since practitioners who place highly in these competitions are often celebrated on tv programs or newspaper articles, it is not surprising that he was proud of his score and assumed others would be as well. He told one of his work superiors at an after-work drinking party about his hobby and his competition success. Instead of his superior congratulating him as he expected, he was told "instead of doing that, you should do something that contributes to society." Although the aforementioned participant successfully worked a full-time office job and trained at the same time, showing up to the studio in a suit on weekday nights and spending his weekends and holidays training, his work-place superiors still expect him to sacrifice himself more for society, which can also be interpreted as one patriarchal extension of the nuclear family. His becomings in pole dance pulled him away from the gender norms operating in one part of his society, the older generation at his workplace.

This participant married a female pole dancer from the same studio, and as of the writing of this paper, they currently perform and appear in competitions together. In my fieldwork, I have also encountered a heterosexual couple in their 40s who competed and opened a chain of pole dance studios together, as well as a heterosexual couple in their 40s who competed and then began a show pub together; both couples have children. There

is also a younger heterosexual couple in their 20s who teach pole dance, operate a pole dance bar, and perform in competitions and events together. When I visited their pole dance bar, the female pole dancer was fully clothed in laid-back black stretch pants and working behind the bar making drinks. It was her male partner as well as another young man who were dancing on the pole on top of the bar, before stripping down to t-back style underpants. The clientele were two female university students and me. I vividly remember the other women laughing and having a good time while the men danced for them. They asked, "where do you buy that underwear in the first place?" referring to the t-back underpants, before searching for the underwear brand on their smartphones and laughing. They were enjoying the scantily clad dancing men, but they also remarked on how they like men but could also see themselves dating women. This example suggests how these pole dancers deterritorialize categories in the first plane and then reterritorialize their gendered bodies to create new pockets of society that allow new possibilities for how gender and sexuality can be lived.

7. Reading D&G'S "Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible"

In this paper, I introduced the emergence of Massumi's affect theory and acknowledged one problem with affect theory in the social sciences, namely the lingering of Cartesian mind-body dualism. I argue for the necessity of a clear ontological framework to overcome mind-body dualism and suggest a return to the theorization of affect in D&G's becomings, in which our existence is not understood through the division of mind and body but through the mapping of two planes of existence, with becomings unfolding in between the two. Further, to chart how becomings unfurl, I propose the application of empirical research on dance. This paper argues that pole dance is a preferable performance form for analyzing becomings because of its demanding physical exertion and bodily transformation as well as its ambiguously deviant social standing. Through pole dance, it becomes clear how becomings are specifically physically practiced beginning with an encounter and proceeded by creative experimentation within relationships with the pole and others.

The discussion of becomings in pole dance began with clarifying the pulling towards the second plane, the realm of the imperceptible. The bruising in pole dance is unique in that it makes the imperceptible movement and affects of pole dance visible for a short period of time; similar to becomings, they also arise and vanish in a manner that is uncontrollable by the practitioner. The

practitioner can only guide the passage from one state to another by choosing whether to follow through with their encounter with pole dance and continue training or whether to stop.

The photographs of bruises were provided to allow the reader to be able to imagine how the body creates different relationships with the pole and on the pole by pressing different parts into it. Not only did I intend for the reader to feel the pain through these photographs, but I hope that they can feel how the volume of affects and augmentation of energy, which practitioners expressed as “fun” in pole dance practice could possibly drown out these sensations of pain, wipe out negative affects in general, and spur the practitioner to continue pole dance as a part of their life. At the same time, I hoped for the reader to imagine the danger of pole dance moving too far towards the second plane, and the possible injury and death awaiting the practitioner.

The bruising is also a symbol of how the practitioner pulls away from the first plane through their encounter with pole dancers and the pole. I portrayed how they pulled away from the first plane only to reterritorialize their bodies and reinvent that first plane by redefining the meaning of the bruise. This was especially true for female pole dancers, but I also digressed from the topic of bruises to discuss how male pole dancers are deviating from stereotypical gender norms in their society. Furthermore, I suggested how they use preexisting categories of the married couple or the night/sex industry but reinvent what their bodies can do in those categories.

This paper clearly outlined how Affects=Becomings emerge in specific physical practice. One might think that practicing and attempting to hone a skill like pole dance couldn't possibly create a becoming, but I illustrated how the uncontrollable creative experimentation hurls the practitioner towards unknown affects, which further spur the practitioner to continue experimentation and further becomings. While D&G's examples of becomings are with clearly deviant groups and abstract passages through bodily states, these empirical examples were the opposite: real life on the first plane is more ambiguous, and bodily becomings drawing towards the second plane are more concrete. To be specific, in real life, presented here through empirical research, pole's deviance is not clear-cut and depends on who is talking and in what context. Also, in real life, bodily transformations are visceral and can be felt by the researcher, and possibly even the reader through photographs and descriptions. Whereas D&G's examples of becomings draw from mostly works of fiction or representations of becomings, this paper bases its idea of becomings on empirical research not only understood by me verbally or visually but through my own moving muscular sinewy body on the pole- theory grounded in the researcher's own body. In other words, this is theory that only the body can do.

References

- Caillois, R. (1961 (1958)), *Man, Play and Games (Le Jeux et les hommes)*, Trans. Meyer Barash, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc.
- Castaneda, C. (1968), *The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge*, Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Coker, C. (2022a), 'I could die—Feeling Affect in the Becomings of Pole Dance Practice (Shinukamo—Pouu Dansu Jissen de Joudou wo Taigen Saseru Seiseihenka)', *Japanese Journal of Cultural Anthropology (Bunka Jinruigaku)*, 86(4): 617-634.
- Coker, C. (2022b), 'Dancing Sensuality- An Anthropology of Eroticism as seen from Pole Dance (Danshingu Kannou- Pouu Dansu kara mita Erosu no Jinruigaku)', *An Anthropology of Sensuality—Overcoming the Sensational Turn (Kannou no Jinruigaku—Kankakutekina Tenkai wo Koete)*, Kyoto: Nakanishiya Publications.
- Deleuze, G. & F. Guattari. (1980(1987)), *Mille plateaux: Capitalisme et schizophrénie, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Massumi B. trans., Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Leys, R. (2011), 'The Turn to Affect: A Critique', *Critical Inquiry* 37(3): 434–472.
- Leys, R. (2017), *The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Martin, E. (2013), 'The Potentiality of Ethnography and the Limits of Affect Theory', *Current Anthropology* 54 (7): 149–58.
- Massumi, B. (1995), 'The Autonomy of Affect', *Cultural Critique* 31: 83-109.
- Massumi, B. (2002), *Parables for the Virtual*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Mazzarella, W. (2009), 'Affect: What is it Good for?', In S. Dube (ed.), *Enchantments of Modernity: Empire, Nation, Globalization*, pp. 291–309, London, UK: Routledge.
- Navaro-Yashin, Y. (2012), *The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Newell, S. (2018), 'The Affectiveness of Symbols: Materiality, Magicity, and the Limits of the Antisemiotic Turn', *Current Anthropology* 59(1): 1-22.
- Skoggard, I. & A. Waterston (2015), 'Introduction: Toward an Anthropology of Affect and Evocative Ethnography', *Anthropology of Consciousness*, 26(2): 109–20.
- Smith, L., Wetherell, M. & G. Campbell (2018), *Emotion, Affective Practices, and the Past in the Present*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Spinoza, B. (1985), *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, E.M.Curley trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stewart, K. (2007), *Ordinary Affects*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Wetherell, M. (2012), *Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding*, London, UK: Sage Publications.

A Sense of Relation: Defining 'Affect'

James D. Letson

Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University

Abstract

Despite being a relatively popular subject of enquiry among the social sciences and humanities in recent decades, 'affect' remains an elusive phenomenon. This paper, rather than trace the development of affect theory in order to pick apart the work of previous scholars, instead explores research that has – implicitly or explicitly – tied affect(s) to relations and relationality. Engaging with anthropological theories of affect and relationships as a form of 'empirical philosophy,' as well as with ethnographic data from my own fieldwork, this work seeks to provide that which has eluded previous theorists of affect: a definition of the phenomenon that is broad enough to cover its many aspects, while remaining concise enough for practical application. In doing so, I come to define affect as no more or less than, *the experiential aspect of relationality*.

Keywords: Affect, Relationality, Anthropology, Collective effervescence

Introduction: Punk Affects

The room is dark and warm, and roughly square. At one end is a stage, standing at about waist-height, while opposite it is a booth containing sound and lighting equipment, and a small, curved counter which acts as both reception and bar. This is one of Japan's many 'livehouses'¹ (small-scale, independent live music venues – see Namai 2019), located in a not-very-salubrious neighbourhood in Sapporo, the main city on Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido. The basement room has around 50 people in it who are variously chatting, buying or drinking cans of beer, or simply catching their breath. Four of the city's local hardcore punk bands have performed already and everyone is waiting for the final band. The headline act are very popular in the local punk community and beyond, being one of the representative artists of 'Japacore' (Japanese-style hardcore punk – see Letson 2021; 2022), who have been active in the international underground punk scene for almost four decades. There is a particular anticipation hanging in the air; after being on hiatus for two-and-a-half years due to COVID-19-related restrictions, the band are returning to the stage.

The musicians appear and start casually tuning their instruments and checking the sound. A few stray cheers and whistles emerge from the crowd as a kind of pressure seems to build in the air. The vocalist appears, steps up

to the microphone and offers a casual greeting, "hey! It's been a while."² Distorted electric guitar chords blast out of the speakers and the drummer explodes into a hectic beat. The audience cheers and the twenty-or-so people nearest the front of the stage bunch closer together, pumping their fists and moving their bodies in time with the music's rapid tempo. Two people right in front of the stage start 'moshing' – shoving, pushing, and smashing into each other with aggressive, violent bodily contact (see Overell 2014; Riches 2011). Another person joins them, then another, soon six or seven people are involved and I feel a compunction to lend myself to the fray.

As I push my way through the crowd towards the 'mosh pit' (the name given to the area immediately in front of the stage where most moshing occurs), I recognise one of the participants as an important interlocutor, informant, and fieldwork collaborator. His help, advice, and information have been invaluable to my anthropological research on the punk community in Sapporo. I grab his shoulder from behind and shove him, hard. He careens into another moshers and bounces back into me. His face splits into a wicked grin as he takes hold of my arms and swings me towards the biggest knot of activity. Soon we are all cannoning off each other in a chaotic mess of limbs, hair, and sweat. Some of the impacts are hard enough to raise bruises the next day, but in the moment nobody seems to care.

Not all the audience react in this manner, however.

1 ライブハウス (raibuhausu).

2 や、久しぶり! (ya, hisashiburi).

Indeed, as far as I was able to count from my in-the-thick-of-it vantage point, there were never more than seven or eight people in the mosh at any one time. Some left, others joined, most moshed until the end of the song. The majority of the audience choose to enjoy and participate in the show in different ways. While a small circle opens up in the crowd to simultaneously accommodate and contain the violence of the mosh pit, those outside it move their bodies, nod their heads, pump their fists, cheer, clap, tap their feet, sing along, cross their arms, drink beer, or enact some combination of any or all of the above.

How do we explain these differences in behaviour? How should we interpret the physical aggression of myself and my fellow moshers towards our friends and peers? How do we account for those that chose not to join the mutual violence? Everyone in that space experienced the same stimuli; the same atmosphere, the same music, the same sights and smells. Everyone had been waiting for this during the privations of COVID-19 and everyone who was there had deliberately chosen to be there. Everyone there knew each other, and was familiar with the music of the band. I have been conducting ethnographic fieldwork with the Sapporo punk community for over 3 years, and I did not notice anyone there that night who was ‘new’ or ‘unknown’ to the scene. All of the participants were active and committed members of the same subcultural community, and thus all had at least a level of shared, embodied, cultural knowledge regarding the music, its style and themes, and the meanings of these vis-à-vis community identity. As such knowledge forms the basis of subcultural identity and belonging (Haenfler 2014; Thornton 1995), and as music and dance is such a powerful tool for the realization of social integration (Durkheim 1995; Turino 2008), it would be reasonable to expect most – if not all – of the crowd at the livehouse to be caught up in the ‘collective effervescence’ (Durkheim 1995 – see below) of the mosh. However, only a very few found themselves swept up in such a manner by the intensity of the moment. So why and how did this shared experience result in such an array of physical reactions? Clearly the live music experience works in a complex and non-linear fashion, but what exactly connects the cause with the effect(s)?

The answer lies in understanding *affect*. What affects were at play in the situation at hand, and how did they interact with the body/minds of the audience? If we understand this, then we can understand why people from the same social group may have such different reactions to the same stimulus. However, in order to do this, it is necessary to answer a much more fundamental, and indeed, much more difficult question: what is affect?

The Big Question: What is Affect?³

‘Affect’ has become something of a buzz word in the humanities and social sciences in recent decades (Leys 2017) and anthropology has been no exception. Despite it being the object of a large number of varied studies across disciplines, exactly what affect is and what it means remains open to debate. Broadly speaking, it pertains to the processes through which humans experience and process sensory and emotional stimuli. In psychology, the term is used more-or-less interchangeably with ‘emotion’ (cf Tomkins 1992). However, in the other social sciences, affect is often assiduously separated from it, instead being understood as a “pre-personal” phenomenon (Massumi 2002; Stewart 2007). In other words, it can be understood to be stimuli which have the *potential* to elicit emotion, but *before* they have been cognitively processed as such.

As Brian Massumi puts it, it may be considered “the capacity to affect and be affected” (Massumi 1980 [1987]: xvi). As such, social theorists often place it in opposition to cognition and intellect, being related more to studies of the body, the senses, and the emotions, than to thought and ideas (Leys 2011; 2017). However, as will become clear below, this dichotomous approach has raised more problems than it has solved, and more recent scholarship has sought to illustrate the symbiosis of affect and cognition, rather than their separation.

While current research trends have sought to transcend – or, at the very least, bridge the gap between – the mind/body binary which has been implicit in previous literature, a definition of affect which comprehensively incorporates all the aspects of this phenomenon remains elusive (Lutz 2017). Anthropologists, in particular, with their focus on ground-up theorizing based on long-term participant observation and ethnographic data (Malkki 2007), have long sought an understanding of affect which reflects the complex, nuanced, ‘messy’ realities of everyday human life (for example, Stewart 2007; Nishii & Yanai et al 2020).

In this paper, rather than trace the development of affect-related anthropological theory as an exercise in theoretical genealogy (for such a review, see DeAntoni 2019), I instead engage with it as a form of ‘empirical philosophy’ (Mol 2002: xiii-ix), grappling with the ideas that allow us to ‘think with’ affect (cf Lévi-Strauss 1963). Most studies of affect take as their starting point the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza – most commonly noted as one of the principal opponents of Cartesian philosophy in Europe (cf Deleuze & Guattari 1987; Leys

3 Parts of this paper have been adapted from the author’s Masters thesis (修士論文), which is available on request from Hokkaido University Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences.

2017). While Spinoza does appear in my outline of affect theory, I begin with a consideration of Émile Durkheim's concept of 'collective effervescence.' By starting with arguably the first modern sociological theory to posit a mutual relationship between affect and cognition, I show how affect theory has been inherently concerned with the sensual experience of relationships, even if this has not always been explicitly recognised. From this, I put forward a definition of affect as, 'the experiential aspect of relationality,' which seeks to provide a concise yet comprehensive concept of this fundamental facet of human experience.

Values of Intensity: Émile Durkheim's 'Collective Effervescence'

In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, first published in 1912, Durkheim brings together ethnographic data from a number of sources in a consideration of what he considers to be the most 'basic' or 'primitive' forms of religious activity in human society. While the obvious social evolutionism underpinning this enterprise would be anathema for most current scholars, this work nevertheless provides important insights into the behaviours apparent in the social physicality of communal events. In doing so, he provides a view of collective behaviour as both cause and effect of the interplay between affect and cognition.

For Durkheim, religious, and particularly ritual activity is simultaneously a practice and a representation of a collective mental state. These representative practices are furthermore "the product of an immense cooperation that extends not only through space but also through time" (1995: 15). That is, collective behaviour maintains a group's connections to its shared history and worldview, while at the same time (re)creating the mental and emotional bonds of sociality necessary for such behaviour in the first place. Thus, a collective act is not only a physical affirmation of communal bonds, but also a semiotic representation of the community itself.

At the centre of this concept is the idea of social or collective 'effervescence' (Durkheim 1995). That is, the heightened experience of communality that provides the impetus for crowds or groups to act in ways which in other social contexts would be considered unacceptable, or even immoral (Durkheim 1952). Beyond the religious ecstasies of Durkheim's collective effervescence, the most obvious examples of this phenomenon are rioting, looting and other forms of social unrest, although it is entirely possible to include the musically inspired violence of the mosh pit here, too (see Overell 2014; Riches 2011). In this conception, people are seen as capable of such behaviours only when energized by "a sort of electricity [that] is generated from their

closeness" (Durkheim 1995: 217). Furthermore, this collective intellect, simultaneously effervescing from and transcendent of the individuals involved, is co-constitutive of the physical actions which are both a material manifestation and a semiotic representation of the shared thoughts and experiences of the crowd.

In his earlier work, *Suicide* (1897), Durkheim explains the creation of such a state as a dialectic process. People in close proximity experience the same affective stimulus while also perceiving that those around them have experienced it, as well. This collective psychophysiological experience combines with the semiotic cognition of each individual, who simultaneously imagines that those around them – having experienced the same phenomenon – are concurrently thinking in the same way. Thus, the collective state is born from "a penetration, a fusion of a number of states within another, distinct from them" (Durkheim 1952: 77). In addition, those nearby who are not experiencing this collective mental state may still add to it, by feeling pressured to conform to the emergent social behaviour due to their close proximity to it. In short, collective effervescence may be described as an affectively experienced 'social force' (ibid).

For Durkheim, a social force is a pressure born from the social group, which compels the individual to act in a way that conforms to the norms of said group. Despite pointing out the necessity of what he refers to as an individual's personal 'disposition' in determining how one is affected by social forces, Durkheim consistently frames his ideas in a way which infers that the individual has no real power to resist them (cf Durkheim 1952: 75; 1995: 367-369). Such pressures are vaguely defined and 'felt,' rather than understood. As such, in contemporary understandings they can be considered to be affective in nature (Mazzarella 2009).

As Giddens (1976) has pointed out, such a view reduces individual agency to the point where it becomes practically non-existent. The implication of Durkheim's theories is that the moment one enters a group, one is no longer able to act as one would when alone. If one considers this point in tandem with the micro-social theories of scholars such as Erving Goffman (1956), or the socio-ecological theories of Gregory Bateson (2000) or Bruno Latour (1993) in which individual agents (human and/or non-human) are constantly acting in relation to one another, it may be considered true, up to a point. However, it denies that people possess the agency to act strategically within the group in order to pursue their personal goals. Thus, while it is possible to view society as a *sui generis* phenomenon which applies certain forces and pressures on its members, it is also certain that its relationship with those individual members is not as simple or as one-way as Durkheim infers.

Furthermore, as Gross (2006) and Lukes (2007) highlight in their comparisons of Durkheim with the philosophy of John Searle (1995), social forces are posited as the results of the group's ability to assign power and status to objects or people that are separate from their 'natural' meaning. Such an argument rests on the notion that this representation is founded wholly on the semiotic power of symbolic language (Gross 2006). As such, in much the same way as he prioritised the social at the expense of the individual, so too does Durkheim give primacy to the linguistic (and, by extension, the cognitive) over the affective and the sensual.

Despite these criticisms, to which careful attention must be paid, it is clear that his work provides an ideal starting point from which to consider problems related to the affective nature of sociality. In particular, his view that the emergence of a given collective behaviour stems from a process which is simultaneously sensual and cognitive, affective and semiotic (Mazzarella 2009). Although it is imperative that anyone who seeks to follow this theoretical approach does not give primacy to one over the other.

Networks and Relations: From the 'Social' to the 'Ecological'

The first scholar to attempt an approach which deliberately sought to synthesize affect and cognition was, arguably, anthropologist Gregory Bateson. In his early ethnographic monograph, *Naven* (1958), Bateson uses the eponymous ritual of the Iatmul people of Papua New Guinea to explore, analyse, and explicate both the cultural 'ethos' of the Iatmul, as well as what he terms their 'eidōs.' The former word is borrowed from the work of Ruth Benedict, who coined the term to describe the dominant personality traits within cultural groups, which are both fostered and represented by sociocultural forms and structures (see Benedict 1959). That is, the behaviours and personality traits that are considered desirable by the group, and which manifest themselves through cultural forms such as dance, ritual, art, and so on. The term, eidōs, on the other hand, refers to the internal logical schema that define the structure of the group. For instance; rules, laws, 'common sense,' and other codifications of what is and is not acceptable to the group, and the commonly held concepts and understandings which set out how and why things are done in a certain way. This, in turn, feeds back on the traits or characteristics of its ethos. Or, as Bateson puts it, "ethos and eidōs are the *affective and cognitive* aspects of [cultural] personality (1958: 255, my emphasis). In this way, much like Durkheim, Bateson stresses the dual nature of the causes of communal behaviour in

its relation to culture. However, Bateson is also guilty of the same mistake as Durkheim; namely, privileging structural explications of the Iatmul cultural eidōs, over an exploration of the affective ethos, implying a hierarchical relation between the two. To his credit, Bateson himself admits as much in the epilogue of *Naven's* second edition (1958: 280-302).

Following *Naven*, Bateson would go on to expand, revise, and refine his theories, incorporating ideas from psychology, cybernetics, and communications theory. This work culminated in his magnum opus, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, published in 1972, in which he draws together these differing strands of theory to expound an ecological explanation of human behaviour. From research on topics as diverse as psychopathy, cetacean communication, and epigenetics, Bateson builds a concept of the human mind as an ecological aggregate of ideas. The definition of the word, 'idea' in the book is left deliberately vague (see Bateson 2000: 1), although it is clear from his writings that this word can be considered as pertaining to any given immanent or emergent phenomenon. This theory sees thought, behaviour, and even existence as fundamentally relational. That is, no idea or phenomenon would come into being without the specific interactions between all the myriad agents acting in and on a specific place at a specific time. These agents include anything that is exerting some kind of influence on the emergence of the phenomenon in question, such as historicity, genetics, environment, social context, cultural influences, and so on and so forth.

This way of thinking constitutes a significant shift from the scientific positivism of Bateson's predecessors. Here, culture, behaviour, or any kind of phenomenon, human or non-human, is no longer seen as a fait accompli, but as a work in constant progress. Moreover, it is a work that, rather than being embodied in objects, is emergent in the relationships between those objects. Behaviour, for example, is considered by Bateson to be based on processes of communication which occur within overlapping contexts. While some of these contexts (environment, background noise, body language, and so on) can be understood as affective, others (memory, knowledge, experience) are inherently cognitive or semiotic. Thus, Bateson has brought us from a conception of group behaviour as emergent from a social body that is greater than the sum of its parts, to the notion that behaviour, as an immanent phenomenon, is simultaneously emergent from and constitutive of environmental ecologies of which the 'human' is one part among many (ibid).

Bateson's radical approach to explaining human behaviour arguably became one of the main foundations for subsequent anthropological theories related to assemblage and networks of agency which include both human and non-human actors (see, for example, Latour

1993). Moreover, while these ecological networks are arguably similar to Durkheim's transcendent notion of the collective mind, the influence of non-human actors (animate or otherwise) can now be considered an integral part of the behaviours which emerge from any social group. In addition, the idea of the social can be seen to have shifted from one of physical proximity and 'collective effervescence,' to one of emergent *relationality*.

Given that human experience can be considered to be fundamentally relational in nature, it becomes important to define what exactly is meant by the term, 'relational.' Or, in other words, what exactly *is* a 'relationship?' Put very simply, the word indicates a connection or link between multiple, heterogenous phenomena, as well as their mutual influence and/or relevance within this association. Moreover, as Marilyn Strathern (1995) has illustrated, relationships may be understood as not only *complex* (necessarily consisting of multiple elements), but also *holographic* (similar across any order of scale). In this way, a relationship functions simultaneously as both a phenomenological connection and the abstract conception of that same connection. Thus, paying attention to relationships provides a way to bring together the affective with the cognitive, and even the ontological with the epistemological (ibid; Strathern 2020).

However, the theories of Bateson and others do not really go far enough in their acknowledgement of the affective aspect of relationality. There is always the need for researchers (and especially anthropologists and others who rely on empirical fieldwork) to render experience into data, data into analysis, and analysis into concise and understandable conclusions. Hence, it becomes necessary at this juncture to introduce some of the influential theories which deal explicitly with affect, as both an explicit phenomenon and an abstract subject of theory. After doing so, it will become possible to build a more balanced picture of relationality and the role of affect within it.

More than a Feeling: Affect, Cognition, Ontology

In addition to the relational ecologies of Bateson and others, in the latter half of the twentieth century 'affect theory' also emerged to challenge the idea that human experience was solely dependent on the cognitive interpretation and physical (re)production of signs and representations. In Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's philosophical work, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), which arguably popularized the notion of affect, the word is used to denote "a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution

in that body's capacity to act" (Massumi, in Deleuze & Guattari 1987: xvi).

Taking the seventeenth century anti-Descartian philosophy of Baruch Spinoza as their starting point, Deleuze and Guattari pay particular attention to the concept of 'passions;' emotions which are able to exert power or influence over humans due to their externality (Spinoza 2000). For Spinoza (and later for Deleuze and Guattari), cognitive capacity may be disrupted or even destroyed by an external affect when it encounters a human body/mind and manifests as a distinct emotion. Indeed, the only phenomenon with enough power to rid a person of such an emotion is another emotion (Spinoza 2000: 11).

Taking this as a foundation for further theoretical exploration, Brian Massumi's *Parables for the Virtual* (2002), attempts to construct a comprehensive theory of affect. In addition to the aforementioned, Massumi draws on scholarship from literary theory and, in particular, psychology, to expound a notion of affect as an experience of intensity over quality. For Massumi, affect is fundamentally external to the personal, "a nonconscious, never-to-be-conscious autonomic remainder" (Massumi 2002: 25) that exists outside the semiotic and semantic processes through which the individual forms their understanding of the world. Furthermore, by taking this 'autonomy' as the defining feature of affective phenomena, he emphasises its 'potentiality.' That is, the ability of affect to provide a bridge between the virtual (the potential worlds formed in the mind by the imaginations and expectations afforded by the accumulation of life-experience) and the actual (the reality emergent in the outcome of the virtual as it meets the complex stimuli of lived life).

This understanding of affect, in addition to Deleuzian philosophy, draws heavily on psychological notions of affect, particularly the work of Silvan Tomkins and Benjamin Libet. Tomkins' authoritative four volume work (1962; 1963; 1991; 1992) on the psychology of affect remains one of the foundational texts for researchers studying this aspect of human psychology (Frank & Wilson 2020). According to Tomkins, rather than being separate from cognition, the processes of the body's 'affect system' and the 'cognitive system' are fundamentally co-constitutive. Except in the case of psychological disorders, they are completely symbiotic and thus, inseparable (Tomkins 1962). However, rather than feeding into each other directly, they instead work in parallel, each amplifying or dampening the effects of the other as the body/brain autonomically prioritises which stimuli to apply its finite resources to at any given time (Tomkins 1992).

While Massumi takes up Tomkins' notion of affect and cognition acting as mutual amplifiers/dampeners, he uses the work of Libet (1985) to support his insistence

on their separation. Libet showed that humans registered a half-second lapse between deciding on an action and carrying it out. Following Libet's conclusions, Massumi posits that this 'missing half-second' implies that affect and cognition exist in a hierarchical relationship, where affect is the 'raw' or 'natural' stimulus-in-itself which is then amplified or dampened by the brain's cognitive processes, contrary to Tomkins' theory of mutual, co-dependent amplification/dampening. Furthermore, beyond being separate from each other, he also asserts that affect and cognition are systems that – if not exactly contrary to each other – operate at cross purposes, interfering more than augmenting. In his words affect is "an intimation of what comes next," which cognition "runs counter to and dampens" (ibid: 26). Thus, implying that cognition, or semiotic processing, is nothing more than a post-facto attempt to apply an explicable narrative to what was originally a purely autonomic response to an affective stimulus that exists independent of the body experiencing it.

Following Massumi, anthropologist Kathleen Stewart (2007) employed his theories to illustrate the affective nature of agency, as well as the power of affect in the shaping of emergent realities within an everyday context. For Stewart, affect can be likened to an energy that infuses the various bodies that occupy a given space and provide them with the impetus for movement and action, "an animate circuit that conducts force and maps connections" (Stewart 2007: 3). It is, essentially, a substitute for Durkheim's 'social forces.' Nonetheless, despite Stewart's efforts to highlight the grounded nature of affect, it is still very much a phenomenon which is understood to "[be] transpersonal or prepersonal" (Stewart 2007: 128), implying that it is something that exists outside bodies, which must sense and interpret it in order to function agentially.

However, according to historian Ruth Leys (2011), Massumi and his followers cited only psychology research that backs up their notion of the 'non-intentionality' of affect, while ignoring other psychological theories which have challenged this idea (for example, Fridlund 1994; Lazarus & Folkman 1984). In doing so, they have side-lined the inherent interestedness of affect – how it not only moves between actors, but how it is also *moved* by them (Lutz 2017) – and have employed positivist 'scientific' approaches in an implicit hierarchy where the humanities and social sciences are seen to require the 'hard sciences' in order to prove their theories correct (Martin 2013). In short, these scholars have excised affects from the emotions they are inherently tied to and, in doing so, have created a category so abstract it no longer bears much resemblance to the lived experience of human life (Skoggard & Waterston 2015).

Essentially, while they have considered the human

body a receiver, or even, a 'conductor' of affect, they have all-too-often ignored the ability of the body to generate or to charge affects (see Fridlund 1994). Moreover, by insisting on demarcating where the 'natural' flows of affect end and the 'complications' of human cognition begin, they have arguably failed to escape the essentialist dualisms which underpin much of Euro-American modernist thought (Nishii & Yanai 2020). In short, not only have they failed to overcome the body/mind dichotomy, they have further conflated it with the culture/nature divide (cf Descola 2013).

In answer to this problem, sociologist Margaret Wetherell (2012), puts forward a theory of 'affective practice.' Wetherell argues that affect forms a vital component of the everyday practices through which humans produce meaning. In other words, affect is inextricably linked with praxis, and together both are productive of human understanding. Her approach foregrounds humans' roles in the creation of affects, as well as in their reception, and places the body at the point of intersection and interaction where "possibilities and routines become...entangled together with meaning making" (Wetherell 2012: 19). This focus on bodily practice as part of how people simultaneously produce and interpret meaning in response to affect provides a counterbalance to the abstracted potentialities of Massumi-inspired affect theories. It also brings back Durkheim's original point that the affective and the cognitive, the embodied and the intellectual, work in tandem.

Andrea DeAntoni takes this a step further. In his work he builds on the understanding of the duality of affect to develop a practical approach that allows for the complex interplay of body, mind, space, network, discourse, material, self, non-self/other, and environment as experienced through affect. He argues for a focus on 'feeling,' or rather, "feeling with the world" (DeAntoni & Dumouchel 2017: 94; see also DeAntoni & Cook 2019). The plural connotations of this verb (in English, at least), along with the qualifying statement which informs us that it is an action that is done *together*, affords theorists a neat discursive device that pulls together the multiple roles and influences that affect fulfils in the everyday doings and becomings of life (DeAntoni 2019).

If "feeling with the world" provides a practical and operative definition of what affect allows human actors to do, there still remains the problem of clearly defining – in a similarly practical manner – what exactly affect *is*. Anthropologists publishing in the Japanese language have, in recent years, attempted to approach affect theory in a slightly different way. Notably, Nishii and Yanai (2020), by returning to a direct engagement with Spinoza's philosophy, have sought to bypass the influence of Massumi and other scholars who they feel have muddied the theoretical waters. For them,

affect (although they prefer Spinoza's original term, 'affectus') is more than just the "flipside of Western modernist human-centrism"⁴ (Nishii & Yanai 2020: 2, my translation), affect is *productive of* existence. It is the experiential process each living thing takes part in when it "takes in that which is outside"⁵ (Nishii & Yanai 2020: 3, my translation). In other words, they assert that affect can be understood as the sensual encounter through which living things both experience *and* make sense of the relationality of being. For Yanai, in particular, this notion of affect ties in with animist ontologies of existence as "whole-yet-multiple"⁶ (Yanai 2020: 44, my translation), and provides a foundation for understanding the universal pluralities of a nature which is inclusive of – rather than separate from – humanity (see also Descola 2013).

This Japanese answer to 'Western' theorists' so-called, 'turn to affect,' affords a perspective that is simultaneously 'non-Western,' yet acknowledges that in a post-colonial, globalised world, no point of view can ever be fully removed from 'Western' modes of thinking (Navaro 2017). It thus provides a deeper reading of the consequences of Spinoza's philosophy, carrying the notion of affect to its furthest possible conclusion. Moreover, by grounding it in our experience of reality, Nishii and Yanai's concept of affect as being constitutive of processual existence goes some way painting a more generative view of embodied affect. In doing so, they have additionally connected affect to the anthropological understanding of existence (social, natural, or universal) as fundamentally relational.

In this way, we have come back to the entanglement of affect with relationality, as well as with cognition. It has also become obvious that paying attention to affect affords us a way to span the gap between the ontological and the epistemological. Such a potentially broad theory hence requires a definition that encompasses all of its phenomenological aspects, while remaining succinct and clear enough to be practically applicable to the seemingly endless variation of everyday life, even when attempting to theorise with it through the abstractions of academic thought.

Conclusion: Affect as the Experiential Aspect of Relationality

The point I am making in this paper is not that previous scholars and theorists of affect have been

wrong, or mistaken, but simply that they have each provided a piece of a larger picture.⁷ Durkheim showed that the experience of sociality was affective as well as cognitive, *felt* as well as understood. Bateson brought to light the processual and mutually productive nature of relationships, of which affect is a necessary part. Massumi and Stewart highlighted the non-linearity of the relation between affect and cognition, and the importance of affect as potentiality. Wetherell and DeAntoni tied affect to both sensual praxis and to the epistemological, while Nishii and Yanai illustrated its role in ontological world-making. Although each of these theories of affect has had its shortcomings, that does not diminish the importance of what may be learned from them. It would be foolish to throw the baby out with the bathwater – so to speak – by ignoring their contributions to the debate.

It is clear that affect is not only the intensity of potential. Neither is it neatly divisible from the emotions it invokes or the cognitive processes by which and through which it is rendered understandable. It is the sense that some person, object, context or situation matters in some way to the sensor, as well as the emergent experience of that sense. It intimates that either something is coming, something is emerging, or something has manifested. As a phenomenon or event emerges, the affect(s) which heralded it are not so much fulfilled, as translated by the body/mind into an embodied experience. This process may, at first, seem to place affect prior to the emergent experience, however, affect's mutually transformative interactions with the actors involved in its emergent context show that it is not only 'pre-personal,' but also post-personal, intra-personal, and inter-personal.

To put it more simply, affects are constantly changing in both quality and intensity, and are simultaneously infused within, radiate out from, and interact between any given phenomena which are in relation to each other. This, along with the implication that any given stimulus can only be described as 'affective' if there is a feeling body available to encounter it, leads to the conclusion that affect and experience, as well as emotion and cognition, are more than just co-dependent, they are mutually constitutive. In short, affect is what allows us to sense, feel, and experience our relationship with the world around us. By the same token it is also what allows the world around us to experience our being within it. Hence, rather than being merely the *capacity* to affect and be affected, it is more accurate to say that affect is also the *experience* of affecting and being affected.

4 西欧近代的な人間観の裏面 (seiou kindai-teki na ningen-kan no uramen)

5 外部を受け入れる (gaibu wo uke-ireru)

6 全体として「多」なる存在である (zentai to shite "ta" naru sonzai de aru)

7 Of course, there are other pieces of this picture that have not been included here for reasons of time and word-count. For those who wish to know more about anthropological contributions to affect theory, please see DeAntoni (2019) for a concise but authoritative guide.

This more comprehensive theory of affect requires a definition which succinctly encapsulates all the aspects laid out above. I contend that considering affect to be no more or less than *the experiential aspect of relationality* fulfils such a role.

If we return to the mosh pits of Sapporo Punk (as an anthropologist, I feel compelled to return things to ‘the field’), and we consider affect to be at work as the holistic experience of becoming-relations, then the answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper start to become clear. All the attendees at the livehouse were members of the city’s punk community, and all had made a conscious decision – and, indeed, paid a modest entrance fee – to be there. All had been waiting to see this particular band return to the stage following the disruption of COVID-19, and all were familiar the band’s music, as well as the idiosyncrasies of Japanese live music etiquette (see Namai 2022) and with the other members of the audience. When thought about in this way, the affective stimuli in-and-of-itself must have been more-or-less the same for all in attendance, so why did we experience them in such diverse ways? Why were so few of us caught up in the collective effervescence-like activities of the mosh pit?

If we consider affect to be both experiential and relational, then it is something much more than some pre-personal, pre-social ‘intensities’ flowing around and through the crowd like electricity through a circuit (*pace* Stewart 2007). It *is* the circuit. Or, more accurately, it is both what connects the components of the circuit *and* what allows them to *sense* that they are connected. Sensing a connection that is familiar allows us to hook that feeling onto cognitive and semiotic processes through which we amplify those feelings through a form of multiplication-by-association and – in effect – supercharge them. As these ‘supercharged’ affects flow out from us (through our movement, breathing, pupil dilation, words, gestures, and so on), they trigger similar processes in others as we are ‘triggered’ in turn. Proximity and physical touch allow for more direct transference of affect without interference from other stimuli. Thus, it becomes easy to imagine how a person may become ‘caught in a mosh,’⁸ so to speak.

What about those who were *affected* in a different way? This is where it becomes possible to see affect and cognition’s mutual constitution. For these audience members, their familiarity with what they were experiencing triggered a different set of semiotic associations that worked to *change*, rather than charge, the affects as they encountered them. These changed affects were experienced by others even as others

experienced them, making for an almost exponential set of sub-circuits constantly connecting, disconnecting, reconnecting, swapping and shifting parts and places, amplifying, interfering, and feeding back into each other. These sub-circuits form and shape the larger affective flows within the space as much as they are shaped by them. The experience of the event as it is individually sensed, felt and processed by all those involved, is simultaneously dependent on, while also forming an integral part of, the relationships between all the actors involved.

But what of the issue of potentiality? The sensing of our relationships with the people around us, the performers, the venue staff, the music, and even the performance itself, is not something that only happens in the moment. It is an ongoing conversation of mind, body, and autonomous physiology as we simultaneously remember and anticipate those same relationships before, during, and after the concrete experience-in-itself. As the music blasts from the speakers we remember past times we have heard that same pattern of chords, notes, and lyrics; we recall our interactions and conversations (or lack thereof) with the musicians; and we anticipate where the music will take us and how it will make us feel, as well as how it is making us feel in the here-and-now. We also anticipate and imagine how we *want* to feel (Tsai 2007). In addition to the processes outlined above, we also act in ways that we hope will actualize the affective potential into the form we have anticipated, even though the complexities of relations mean that the results are very rarely realized exactly how we imagined.

By entering the mosh, I was not only caught up in the ‘collective effervescence’ of the moment, I was also deliberately choosing to react to and produce affective flows that I anticipated would enhance both my experience and my relationships. Essentially, I knowingly placed myself in a position where there was a high probability that I would get ‘carried away.’ I did so, partly because I wished to experience that very sensation, but also because I wished to show the musicians the depth and strength of my relief that they were able to return to performing after such a prolonged period of uncertainty. Upon noticing my close collaborator in the mosh, I also had an opportunity to (re)forge my relationship with him in a new fashion; one of shared physical experience.

Thus, while the eventual results of my actions may have rested on the outcomes of variables far too complex and multiple for me to ever hope to calculate accurately, I was still an active player in their actualization. Hence, through affective stimuli we sense our relationships, this sense shapes and informs our reactions, which amplify, interfere with, or change those affects, thus reshaping and reforming our relationships in ways which are sensed, in turn, affectively, reacted to, and so on and so forth.

8 This term was first coined by the heavy metal band, Anthrax, and is the title of a song from their 1987 album, *Among the Living*.

Such an ontological cycle necessarily involves processes of understanding and knowing without which we would not be able to form the very relationships we are sensing. A chicken-and-egg style search for which one is prior is thus, ultimately, fruitless (*pace* Massumi 2002), and serves only to further insist on affect's separation from relational reality, whereas I have shown affect to be an integral and inseparable part of it.

Affect is then, in effect, our *sense of relation* with the world around us. As such, it provides a bridge between minds and bodies, self and other, selves and others, relations and other relations, epistemology and ontology, inside and outside, even the past and the future. It is not just 'good to think with,' or even 'good to feel with,' it is a mutually constitutive component of how we think *and* feel, and how we connect those two together. If we consider relationships themselves to be simultaneously formed by and productive of their components, then affect also forms an essential part of the processes, not only of sense-making, but of world-making. In other words, without sensing that we are in a relationship, there can be no relationship; without relationships, there can be no existence. Affect is thus the phenomenon that allows us to feel and to know that we are alive and in the world, and are intimately involved in its constant (re) creation.

References

- Bateson, G. (1936 [1958]). *Naven: A Survey of the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of the Culture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three Points of View* (2nd ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- (1972 [2000]). *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Benedict, R. F. (1934 [1959]). *Patterns of Culture*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- DeAntoni, A. (2019). Affect. In Callan, H. (Ed.). *The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology* [online version]. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- DeAntoni, A. and Cook, E. E. (2019). Feeling (with) Japan: Affective, Sensory and Material Entanglements in the Field—Introduction. *Asian Anthropology* 18(3): 139–53.
- De Antoni, A. and Dumouchel. (2017). The Practices of Feeling with the World: Towards an Anthropology of Affect, the Senses and Materiality—Introduction. *Japanese Review of Cultural Anthropology* 18(1): 91–98.
- Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1980 [1987]). Massumi, B. (Tr.). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Descola, P. (2005 [2013]). Lloyd, J. (Tr.). *Beyond Nature and Culture*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1895 [1982]). Lukes, S. (Ed.), Halls, W. D. (Tr.). *The Rules of Sociological Method*. New York, NY: The Free Press.
- (1897 [1952]). Simpson, G. (Ed.), Spaulding, J. A. & Simpson, G. (Tr.). *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. London, UK: Routledge.
- (1912 [1995]). Fields, K. E. (Ed., Tr.). *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. New York, NY: The Free Press.
- Frank, A. J. & Wilson, E. A. (2020). *A Silvan Tomkins Handbook: Foundations for Affect Theory*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Fridlund, A. J. (1994). *Human Facial Expression: An Evolutionary View*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Giddens, A. (1976). *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies*. London, UK: Hutchinson.
- Goffman, E. (1956). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Edinburgh, UK: University of Edinburgh Social Sciences Centre.
- Gross, N. (2006). Comment on Searle. *Anthropological Theory*, 6(1): 45-56. DOI: 10.1177/1463499606061734
- Haenfler, R. (2014). *Subcultures: The Basics*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Latour, B. (1991 [1993]) Porter, C. (Tr.). *We Have Never Been Modern*. Hemel Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Lazarus, R. S. and Folkman, S. (1984). *Stress, Appraisal, and Coping*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Letson, J. D. (2021). Stay Punk!! Stay Free!! Subcultural Identity, Resistance and Covid-19 in Northern Japan. *Punk & Post Punk*, 10(1), 119-140. DOI: 10.1386/punk_00056_1
- (2022). AS A PUNK DANGLING FROM THE VERTICAL SOCIETY: Punk in Northern Japan as a 'Culture of Transgression'. In Donaghey, J. Kaltefleiter, C. & Boisseau, W. (Eds.). In 'Smash the System!' *Punk Anarchism as a Culture of Resistance*, pp. 337-364. Bristol, UK: Active Distribution Publishing.
- (2023). *The Elementary Forms of Punk Life: Reimagining "Collective Effervescence," Post-COVID-19*. [Masters Thesis] Hokkaido University, 139 pages.
- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1962 [1963]). Needham, R. (Tr.). *Totemism*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Leys, R. (2011). The Turn to Affect: A Critique. *Critical Inquiry*, 37: 434-472. DOI: 10.1086/659353 .
- (2017). *The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 8(4): 529–566. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00044903
- Lukes, S. (2007). Searle Versus Durkheim. In Tsohatzidis, S. L. (Ed.). *Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts*: pp. 191-202. New York, NY: Springer.
- Lutz, C. (2017). What Matters. *Cultural Anthropology*, 32(2): 181-191. DOI: 10.14506/ca32.2.02
- Malkki, L. H. (2007). Tradition and Improvisation in Ethnographic Field Research. In Cerwonka, A. and Malkki, L. H. *Improvising Theory: Process and Temporality in Ethnographic Fieldwork*: pp. 162-187. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Martin, E. (2013). The Potentiality of Ethnography and the Limits of Affect Theory. *Current Anthropology*, 54(7): 149-

158. DOI: 10.1086/670388
- Massumi, B. (2002). *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Durham, MA: Duke University Press.
- Mazzarella, W. (2009). Affect: What is it Good for? In Dube, S. (Ed.) *Enchantments of Modernity: Empire, Nation, Globalization*: pp. 291-309. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Mol, A. (2002). *The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Namai, T. (2022). ライブハウスの人類学：音楽を介して「生きられる場」を築くこと (*Raibuhausu no jinrui-gaku: ongaku wo kai shite 'ikirareru ba' wo kidzuku koto – Anthropology of Livehouses: Constructing a 'Place for Living' through Music*). Kyoto: Kōyō Shobō.
- Navaro, Y. (2017). Diversifying Affect. *Cultural Anthropology*, 32(2): 209-214. DOI: 10.14506/ca32.2.05
- Nishii, R. & Yanai, T. (2020). はじめに：アフェクトゥス（情動）的世界への招待 (Hajime ni: Afekutusu [jōdō]-teki sekai he no shōtai – Introduction: Invitation to an Affectus (Affective) World). In Nishii, R. & Yanai, T. (Eds.). *アフェクトゥス：生の外側に触れる (Afekutusu: Sei no soto-gawa ni fureru – Affectus: Touching the Outside of Life)*. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.
- Overell, R. (2014). *Affective Intensities in Extreme Music Scenes: Cases from Australia and Japan*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Riches, G. (2011). Embracing the Chaos: Mosh Pits, Extreme Metal Music and Liminality. *Journal for Cultural Research*, 15(3): 315-332. DOI: 10.1080/14797585.2011.594588
- Searle, J. R. (1995). *The Construction of Social Reality*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Skoggard, I. & Waterston, A. (2015). Introduction: Towards an Anthropology of Affect and Evocative Ethnography. *Anthropology of Consciousness*, 26(2), 109-120. DOI: 10.1111/anoc.12041
- Spinoza, B. (1677 [2000]). Elwes, R. H. M. (Tr.). *The Ethics. Part IV: Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions*. Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press [ebook].
- Strathern, M. (1995). *The Relation: Issues in Complexity and Scale*. Cambridge, UK: Prickly Pear Press.
- (2020). *Relations: An Anthropological Account*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Thornton, S. (1995). *Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Tsai, J. L. (2007). Ideal Affect: Cultural Causes and Behavioral Consequences. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 2(3), 242-259. DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00043.x
- Tomkins, S. (1962). *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Volume I: The Positive Affects*. New York, NY: Springer.
- (1963). *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Volume II: The Negative Affects*. New York, NY: Springer.
- (1991). *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Volume III: The Negative Affects – Anger and Fear*. New York, NY: Springer.
- (1992). *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Volume IV: Cognition, Duplication and Transformation of Information*. New York, NY: Springer.
- Turino, T. (2008). *Music as Social Life: The Politics of Participation*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Wetherell, M. (2012). *Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding*. London, UK: Sage.
- Yanai, T. (2020). スピノザと「植物人類学」：アフェクトゥス概念の人類学的一展開 (supinoza to “shokubutsu-jinruigaku”): afekutusu gainen no jinruigaku-teki ichi-tenkai – Spinoza and the “Anthropology of Plant Life:” An Anthropological Development of the Concept of Affectus). In Nishii, R. & Yanai, T. (Eds.). *アフェクトゥス：生の外側に触れる (afekutusu: sei no soto-gawa ni fureru – Affectus: Touching the Outside of Life)*. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.

Notes to Contributors

1. All submitted papers are subject to anonymous peer-review, and will be evaluated on the basis of their originality, quality of scholarship and contribution to advancing the understanding of applied ethics and philosophy.
2. Papers should be at most 8,000 words, including references.
3. An abstract of 150-300 words and a list of up to 5 keywords should be included at the beginning of the paper.
4. Papers can be submitted any time of the year by e-mail to jaep@let.hokudai.ac.jp. If the authors wish their papers to be included in the next volume (to be published in March 2025), however, they are advised to submit their papers by September 15th 2024.
5. In-text references should be cited in standard author-date form: (Walzer 1977; Kutz 2004), including specific page numbers after a direct quotation, (Walzer 1977, 23-6).
6. A complete alphabetical list of references cited should be included at the end of the paper in the following style:

Cohen, G.A. (1989), 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', *Ethics*, 99 (4): 906-44.

Kutz, C. (2004), 'Chapter 14: Responsibility', in J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds.), *Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 548-87.

Walzer, M. (1977), *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, New York: Basic Book.
7. Accepted papers will be published in both web-based electronic and print formats..
8. The Editorial Board reserves the right to make a final decision on publication.

